This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the τ -value of digraph games. Among other things monotonicity of this correspondence is shown.
Introduction
A social choice correspondence assigns to each social choice situation a nonempty subset of alternatives. Elements of this subset can be interpreted as most preferred alternatives by society as a whole. There is an abundant literature on different types of social choice correspondences, cf. Fishburn (1977) and Laslier (1997) for surveys. Van den Brink and Borm (1994) and Borm, Van den Brink, Levínsky, and Slikker (2000) use tools of cooperative game theory to define two new social choice correspondences. These correspondences are based on the Shapley value. Quant, Borm, Reijnierse, and Voorneveld (2002) introduce and characterize the τ -value (cf. Tijs (1981) and Tijs (1987) ) of digraph games. This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the τ -value of digraph games. We show that if the compromise correspondence selects some alternative, it remains selected when some agent changes his profile by ranking this alternative higher (monotonicity). Moreover we establish a connection between properties of social choice correspondences based on game theoretical solutions and monotonicity of these solutions. This result can not only be applied to the compromise correspondence, but also to for instance the one derived from the Shapley value.
Social choice situations and digraph games
A social choice situation can be represented by a triple (N, A, p) , in which N is a finite group of individuals or agents, A a finite set of alternatives and p a vector of preference relations of the group of individuals on the set A. The class of all social choice situations is denoted by S. A social choice correspondence C assigns to each social choice situation (N, A, p) ∈ S a non-empty subset C(N, A, p) of A. This set can be interpreted as the set of most preferred alternatives by the group of individuals.
The preference relation of individual i will be denoted by p i , xp i y means that i prefers alternative x to alternative y. We assume that preference relations are linear order preferences. This means that p i is reflexive 1 , complete 2 , transitive 3 and antisymmetric 4 . A profile p = (p i ) i∈N contains 1 A preference relation p i on A is reflexive if for all x ∈ A it holds that xp i x 2 A preference relation p i on A is complete if for all x, y ∈ A it holds that xp i y or yp i x (or both).
3 A preference relation pi on A is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ A it holds that: if xpiy and yp i z, then xp i z.
4 A preference relation pi on A is antisymmetric if for all x, y ∈ A, x = y, xpiy implies the preferences of the individuals in N . With (N, A, p) ∈ S, one can associate a simple majority win digraph D p ⊂ A × A in the following way. For x, y ∈ A, x = y:
where n p (x, y) := |{i ∈ N | xp i y and ¬yp i x}| denotes the number of agents who strictly prefer x to y in profile p. Moreover we assume that (x, x) ∈ D p for each x ∈ A. So for each social choice situation, D p is a reflexive digraph. Here our approach differs from the approach chosen in Borm et al. (2000) , where no loops are present in the digraph D p .
The following example illustrates that the digraph D p can contain a cycle. contains all nodes with exactly one predecessor. If D is reflexive, the set I D contains all nodes andĨ D is the set of all nodes with no other predecessors than itself.
Following Van den Brink and Borm (1994) and Quant et al. (2002) we have:
As usual we take
There is a natural way to associate a social choice correspondence with a (one-point) game theoretical solution. If γ is a game theoretical solution, then the corresponding social choice correspondence C γ is given by:
the set of alternatives to which γ assigns the highest payoff in the corresponding score game.
3 Monotonicity of the compromise social choice correspondence Borm et al. (2000) examines the social choice correspondence C φ corresponding to the Shapley value φ. The τ -value or compromise value, introduced in Tijs (1981) , is a an alternative to the Shapley value based on the minimum right of players and their utopia demand. In this paper we will concentrate on the corresponding so called compromise correspondence C τ . The τ -value of an arbitrary (quasi-balanced) TU-game (A, v) is given by: Quant et al. (2002) proved that for an arbitrary digraph D ⊂ A × A and for x ∈ A: 
This formula holds if
For (N, A, p) ∈ S the compromise social choice correspondence C τ is given by:
Note that for a social choice situation (N, A, p) ∈ S and x ∈ C τ (N, A, p), 
An important property of social choice correspondences is monotonicity. Monotonicity implies that if in a situation (N, A, p) alternative x is a best alternative according to C, then x should be a best alternative according to C in the situation (N, A, p ), where p is a preference relation obtained from p by moving x to the left.
The following theorem states that C τ is monotonic as social choice correspondence. Proof: Let (N, A, p), (N, A, p ) ∈ S and x ∈ A be such that the conditions (i)-(iii) in property 3.1 hold. We assume that p differs only slightly from p, in the sense that there is only one agent i ∈ N for which p i = p i and in p i alternative x has moved one step to the left compared to p i . If one can prove monotonicity for this case, one can prove monotonicity for all cases, just by changing preference profile p into p in small steps and applying the above result at each step. Let y ∈ A be the alternative which is preferred to x in p i , but not to x in p i . The digraphs D p and D p can only differ in three different ways (it is also possible that they are the same, but then there is nothing to prove):
• A new arc (x, y) arises in D p , where in D p no arc between x and y is present.
•
by deleting the arc (y, x) or adding the arc (x, y), or reversing the arc (y, x). Clearly it suffices to prove the following:
Note that the last case (reversing an edge (y, x) in D 1 ) is a combination of the first two cases and hence we only need to consider the first two cases. The trivial cases that |D 1 | = |A| or |D 2 | = |A| are left to the reader.
To simplify notations, we denote e.g. τ x (D 1 ) instead of τ x (v D 1 ) and define for i ∈ {1, 2}:
We first consider the case
Hence c 2 > c 1 and we can conclude that for z ∈ A:
Secondly assume that x ∈Ĩ D 2 , then the following is true:
Since the indegree of a node not inĨ D 1 is at leat two, it holds that:
it follows that:
One can conclude that for z ∈ A\{x}, τ z (D 2 ) ≤ τ z (D 1 ). Because τ is efficient, it then holds that:
We first consider the case that
. Using efficiency we have:
Secondly assume that 
In the third case we assume that x ∈Ĩ D 1 and y ∈Ĩ D 1 . It holds that:
In the final case we assume that
Let z ∈ A\{y}. There are two possible cases.
Secondly let z ∈Ĩ D 1 . Suppose that after adding the arc (y, x) the value of τ -measure of z is larger than the value assigned to x:
Since x achieves the highest payoff in D 1 according to τ , it holds that:
From (2) and (3) it follows that:
Adding (5) and (4) results in:
However, since z ∈Ĩ D 1 we have that
which contradicts formula (6).
Pareto optimality and Smith's Condorcet principle
There are several other interesting properties of social choice correspondences besides monotonicity. We will mention some of them shortly. An alternative x ∈ A is a Condorcet winner in a social choice situation (N, A, p) if for all y ∈ A\{x}, (x, y) ∈ D p . C is a Condorcet social choice correspondence if if for this type of social choice situations C(N, A, p) = {x}. The next property states that if all agents prefer alternative x to alternative y, then y is not a most preferred alternative. Suppose that the set of alternatives can be partitioned in A 1 and A 2 such that the majority of the group prefers an arbitrary alternative from A 1 to an arbitrary alternative of A 2 . The following property states that no alternative of A 2 is a most preferred alternative.
Property 4.2 Smith's Condorcet principle: C satisfies Smith's Condorcet principle if for all (N, A, p) ∈ S: if
Borm, Van den Brink, Levínsky, and Slikker (2000) proved that C φ is a Condorcet social choice correspondence satisfying Pareto optimality and Smith's Concorcet principle. One can prove that C τ is also a Condorcet social choice correspondence satisfying Pareto optimality and Smith's Concorcet principle. This gives rise to the thought that there exists a game theoretical property which implies some properties of social choice correspondences based on a game theoretical solution.
We will define a special type of monotonicity in TU-games. It will turn out to imply various properties in social choice theory. The following proposition states a relation between monotonicity in TUgames and properties of social choice correspondences. Brink and Borm (1994) ). Let γ be a game theoretical solution satisfying monotonicity on the class of convex games. First of all we prove that C γ is a Condorcet social choice correspondence.
Suppose x ∈ A is a Condorcet winner. This means that for each y ∈ A it holds that (x, y) ∈ D p and hence for each y ∈ A and each T ∈ 2 A\{x,y} :
The solution γ is monotonic and hence
We proceed with Pareto optimality. Let x, y ∈ A, such that for all i ∈ N , xp i y. The digraph D p contains the arc (x, y) and if an arc (y, z), z ∈ A, is present, then arc (x, z) is present too. This structure of D p implies that S Dp (y) S Dp (x), from which we can conclude that:
6 One can also prove that if γ is efficient and individual rational on the subclass of convex games, then C γ satisfies the so called subset condition 2, dicussed in Fishburn (1977) . (N, A, p) .
Finally, we show that monotonicity of γ implies Smith's Condorcet Principle. Let (N, A, p) ∈ S be such that A = A 1 ∪ A 2 , A 1 ∩ A 2 = ∅ and (x, y) ∈ D p for all x ∈ A 1 , y ∈ A 2 . Let x ∈ A 1 and y ∈ A 2 , then S Dp (y) S Dp (x). In a similar way as above it follows that for each T ∈ 2 A\{x,y} : v D p (T ∪ {x}) ≥ v D p (T ∪ {y}), and for T = A\{x, y} this inequality is strict. Monotonicity of γ implies γ x (v Dp ) > γ y (v Dp ) and y ∈ C γ (N, A, p), hence A 2 ∩ C γ (N, A, p) = ∅.
As a consequence of theorem 4.1 we can prove that the social choice correspondences based on the τ -value and the Shapley value are Condorcet social choice correspondences satisfying Pareto optimality, Smith's Condorcet principle. Proof: According to theorem 4.1 we only need to prove that the τ -value is monotonic on the class of convex games. Let (A, v) be a convex TU-game and let x, y ∈ A be such that for all T ∈ 2 A\{x,y} it holds that:
with a strict inequality for T = A\{x, y}. Then:
This yields τ x (v) > τ y (v) 7 .
